Normative parties in subject position and in object position

In Martin Blicha & Igor Sedlár (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2020. College Publications. pp. 147-164 (2021)
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Abstract

We analyze some normative relations as instances of a general schema of relations among a finite number of parties; in this schema parties can play various roles grouped into two main conceptual layers, called 'subject position' and 'object position'. Relying on the theoretical apparatus introduced, we develop a new symbolic representation for normative reasoning which constitutes an alternative to approaches available in the literature. Our contribution includes a semantic characterization for a series of logical systems built over the proposed framework.

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Matteo Pascucci
Slovak Academy of Sciences

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