Journal of Value Inquiry 23 (1):51-58 (1989)

Gewirth and hare claim amoralism is contrary to reason. Gewirth believes amoralism to be logically inconsistent. Hare believes amoralism to be imprudent and hence irrational. By defining the problem as one of amoralism rather than 'non'moralism, Gewirth and hare assume illegitimate moral presuppositions. I show their arguments fail by comparing their arguments to the arguments given by someone who accepts the language and presuppositions of magic. I suggest that what is wrong with amoralism is that it leads to immoralism. If this is so, Morality ultimately must be based upon basic moral insights or intuitions
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DOI 10.1007/BF00138685
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