Fairness and Aggregation

Utilitas 27 (4):460-469 (2015)
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Abstract

Sometimes, two unfair distributions cancel out in aggregate. Paradoxically, two distributions each of which is fair in isolation may give rise to aggregate unfairness. When assessing the fairness of distributions, it therefore matters whether we assess transactions piecemeal or focus only on the overall result. This piece illustrates these difficulties for two leading theories of fairness before offering a formal proof that no non-trivial theory guarantees aggregativity. This is not intended as a criticism of any particular theory, but as a datum that must be taken into account in constructing a theory of fairness

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Author Profiles

A. C. Paseau
University of Oxford
Ben Saunders
University of Southampton

References found in this work

V*—Fairness.John Broome - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1):87-102.
Fairness.Brad Hooker - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):329 - 352.
Broome on Fairness and Lotteries.Hugh Lazenby - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (4):331-345.
Fairness between competing claims.Ben Saunders - 2010 - Res Publica 16 (1):41-55.
On Fairness and Claims.Patrick Tomlin - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (2):200-213.

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