Can Self-Deception Explain Akrasia in Kant’s Theory of Moral Agency?

Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):87-97 (1999)
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Lawrence Pasternack
Oklahoma State University

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Kant-Bibliographie 1999.M. Ruffing - 2001 - Kant Studien 92 (4):474-517.

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