Values and evidence: how models make a difference

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (1):125-142 (2018)
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Abstract

We call attention to an underappreciated way in which non-epistemic values influence evidence evaluation in science. Our argument draws upon some well-known features of scientific modeling. We show that, when scientific models stand in for background knowledge in Bayesian and other probabilistic methods for evidence evaluation, conclusions can be influenced by the non-epistemic values that shaped the setting of priorities in model development. Moreover, it is often infeasible to correct for this influence. We further suggest that, while this value influence is not particularly prone to the problem of wishful thinking, it could have problematic non-epistemic consequences in some cases.

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Author Profiles

Eric Winsberg
University of South Florida
Wendy Parker
Virginia Tech

Citations of this work

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Are Algorithms Value-Free?Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2023 - Journal Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):1-35.
Using Paleoclimate Analogues to Inform Climate Projections.Aja Watkins - 2024 - Perspectives on Science 32 (4):415-459.

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References found in this work

Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
In defence of the value free ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.

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