Moral Philosophy and its Anti-pluralist Bias

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40:117-134 (1996)
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Abstract

It is an obvious fact of history that human beings have always entertained and continue to entertain different conceptions of the good and lead very different lives both individually and collectively. This raises two questions. First, why do ways of life differ? And second, how should we respond to their differences? The first is an explanatory, and the second a normative question, and the two are closely related. The first question has been answered differently by different writers, of which I shall mention three by way of illustration

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Value Pluralism, Realism and Pessimism.Kei Hiruta - 2020 - Res Publica 26 (4):523-540.

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