IX—Presupposition, Disagreement, and Predicates of Taste

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (2pt2):163-173 (2013)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTI offer a simple‐minded analysis of presupposition in which if a sentence has a presupposition, then both that sentence and its negation logically entail the presupposition; and in which sentence with failed presuppositions are neither true nor false. This account naturally generates an analysis of what it takes to disagree and what it takes to be at fault in a disagreement. A simple generalization gives rise to the possibility of disagreements in which no party is at fault, as is required by leading theories on predicates of taste.

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Author's Profile

Josh Parsons
PhD: Australian National University; Last affiliation: University of Otago

References found in this work

On referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):544-545.
Presupposition, implication, and self-reference.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):136-152.

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