The Philosophical Interest of Rawls' Theory of Justice
Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook (
1983)
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Abstract
Rawls' theory of justice shares the fundamental shortcomings of the utilitarian conception of justice which it seeks to replace. The aim of this dissertation is, first, to provide a comprehensive reading of Rawls' theory which exhibits its internal structure and, second, to make explicit both the theory's lack of coherence and the undesirable, yet unavoidable, implications for the conceptions of person and society which follow from its central assumptions. ;The exposition of Rawls' theory is divided into two parts. Part one treats Rawls' social and political philosophy. I show how Rawls' original position is best understood as a perspective on justice arrived at by varying the utilitarian point of view in response to criticisms of its moral relevance. Part two analyzes the role which Rawls establishes for moral theory in resolving the traditional philosophical problems of the meaning of moral language and the nature of moral truth. Rawls construes moral theory as an inquiry designed to describe the structure of our shared moral conception, I examine the manner and extent to which descriptive moral theory can answer the traditional problems of moral philosophy, the nature of the moral point of view on Rawls' account, and the broadly empirical constraints on method which Rawls' theory incorporates. ;To conclude, I focus the elements which bring the theory's shortcomings into relief, and I argue that Rawls' notion of a fully adequate moral theory is inconsistent with his own account of the nature of morality. I then show how Rawls' conception of justice implies that persons are fundamentally alienated from their plans of life and thus severs the unity of person. Finally, I show how Rawls' liberal conception of justice cannot overcome the conception of society which he attributes to utilitarianism and which he argues is inadequate for the purposes of understanding justice