Some conclusive reasons against 'conclusive reasons'

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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):72 – 76 (1973)
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10.1080/00048407312341061

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Citations of this work

Resurrecting the tracking theories.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
More on knowledge before Gettier.Pierre Le Morvan - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-9.
The Tracking Theory of Claim‐Rights.Mark McBride - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):256-276.
The Tracking Theory of Claim‐Rights.Mark McBride - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):256-276.

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The explication of "X knows that p".Brian Skyrms - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):373-389.

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