Revus 28:33-52 (2016)

Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of the various dimensions of independence and impartiality. Among other things, I will argue that the two concepts, both of which are profoundly implicated in the rule of law, can be conceived as values and are perfectly distinguishable from each other. I will also propose a conception of neutrality, as a third distinct value that satisfies the requirement for non-redundancy with regard to independence and impartiality. Hence, judges and arbitrators must be independent, impartial and neutral. Each of these values contributes in different ways to enabling the law to fulfil its distinctive function of facilitating social interaction in complex and plural societies.
Keywords independence   impartiality   neutrality   judicial decision   arbitration   neodvistnost   nepristranskost   nevtralnost   sodna odločba   arbitraža
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Legality.Scott J. Shapiro (ed.) - 2011 - Harvard University Press.
Needs, Values, Truth.David Wiggins - 1990 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 180 (1):106-106.

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