Computational indeterminacy and explanations in cognitive science

Biology and Philosophy 37 (6):1-30 (2022)
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Abstract

Computational physical systems may exhibit indeterminacy of computation (IC). Their identified physical dynamics may not suffice to select a unique computational profile. We consider this phenomenon from the point of view of cognitive science and examine how computational profiles of cognitive systems are identified and justified in practice, in the light of IC. To that end, we look at the literature on the underdetermination of theory by evidence and argue that the same devices that can be successfully employed to confirm physical hypotheses can also be used to rationally single out computational profiles, notwithstanding IC.

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Author Profiles

Philippos Papayannopoulos
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Nir Fresco
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Oron Shagrir
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Individualism and psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
Individuation without Representation.Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):103-116.

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