Argumenta 3 (2):353-366 (2018)

Authors
Michele Paolini Paoletti
Università degli Studi di Macerata
Abstract
According to many philosophers, even if it is metaphysically possible that I exist without my present body or without my present brain, it is not metaphysically possible that I exist without any physical support. Thus, it is not metaphysically possible that I exist in some afterlife world, where I do not have any physical support. I shall argue against such a thesis by distinguishing two different notions of physical and by examining two strategies used by those who defend the thesis. No strategy will turn out to be conclusive. Thus, it seems that nothing excludes the metaphysical possibility of disembodied existence. Moreover, I shall illustrate two ways (respectively based on modal realism and on modal actualism) in which one might conclude that my disembodied existence is something more than a mere possibility.
Keywords dualism  immortality  physicalism  mind
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Routledge.

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