Abstract

I . Mental time travel is a contemporary philosophical notion, although at first glance it may seem anachronistic, mental time travel and the Aristotelian theory of memory are in a way compatible . What is proposed is a theoretical dialogue between the contemporary research in philosophy of memory and its most traditional theory. In this sense the way to analyze the compatibility is to present the fundamental notions of mental time travel in analogy to the Aristotelian system to an extent that the notion of mental time travel may be extracted from the Aristotelian system, therefore the Aristotelian theory of mental time travel. The taxonomical discrepancy of one system of thought and the other is addressed via correspondence, approaching the two systems by what each notion expresses. II . Mental time travel is, through our capacity of perceiving time, here understood as chronesthesia, a power that gives access to events in time, which are not present, and according to the temporal orientation of the mental time travel, the events are about the past or the future . First, there is the capacity of perceiving time, in a way that the re-production of the past and the production of possible future events are dependent. Memory is re-production of what is past, then mental time travel past oriented, which is grounded by chronesthesia . III . Memory as mental time travel is what specific concerns the correspondence with the Aristotelian theory of memory . To address this, there is the need to address the problem of subjective time and mind in the Aristotelian theory of memory. What is nearer to mind is the soul, ψυχή , and to experience subjective time, the way someone when recollects says in their soul that is recollecting that first said, or heard or thought what is being recalled . (Mem. 429b15–29). Mem.449b23–24. αει γαπ οταν ενεργη κατα μνημονευειν, ουτως εν τη ψυχη λεγει οτι προτερον τουτο λεγει, οτι προτερον τουτο ηκουσεν η ησθετο η ενόησεν. IV . If someone has an occurence of episodic memory. To explain this case via mental time travel: someone (i) experienced an event, (ii) has chronesthesia functionally grounding the experience and the possibility to access the experience of the anterior event after it is past, (iii) is oriented to the past, among past experiences it is possible to re-produce the specific anterior event . Considering mental time travel with causal relation, what it is not necessary to it. V . The Aristotelian theory also disposes of perception of time as fundamental to memory, μνημη . The perception of time is placed as perception as a whole, common perception, αισθησις κοινη. Considering time, χρονος , understood as counting of the anterior-posterior, αριθμος κινησεως κατα το προτερον και υστερον (Phys.IV,11,219b1–2), and what is countable is perceived by perception of the commons, αισθεσιν κοινην . The common perception is first and responsible for memory and imagination, φαντασια . Thus memory is dependent of imagination, because it works through images; and of perception and perception of time, for there is no memory without the perception of something before and time lapse; and it is grounded by common perception . VI . Now the case of episodic memory, as remembering, μνημονεύουν, and recollecting, αναμνεσις. (i) an event causes in who is perceiving, (ii) from the sense organs remains something and imprints something in the soul, (iii) what remains is an image, similarity of the perceived, εικον, and that is what one re-produces when remembering and what may be recovered through a recollection search . VII . The relation between contemporary notion of time perception and common perception was established. Memory as dependent of perception of time and works as responsible for what is of the past. In such way leads the conclusion that remembering and recollecting can be considered mental time travel past oriented.