Presentism and Some Related Questions Concerning Language and Modality

Dissertation, University of Notre Dame (2004)
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Abstract

Presentism is the view that necessarily, everything is present. According to presentists, our quantifiers range over only objects that presently exist; no domain of quantification could include merely past or merely future objects. ;In chapter one, I discuss differences between presentism and alternative views. I also consider motivations for embracing presentism and motivations for rejecting it. Finally, I outline central problems and questions for presentists. The chapter's main purpose is to offer the reader a thorough understanding of the central elements of the presentist's way of viewing the world. ;Many fascinating questions arise in connection with the debate between presentists and nonpresentists. In chapters two through four, I address the following questions: How should presentists formulate their central thesis? How should presentists think about modality? How should presentists account for apparent references to nonpresent objects? ;In chapter two, I discuss difficulties that arise in connection with common formulations of the presentist thesis, and I offer a formulation which is not vulnerable to such difficulties. In chapter three, I consider the bearing of presentism on three theories of possible worlds: the accounts developed by David Lewis, Alvin Plantinga, and Robert Adams, respectively. I go on to further explore the project of developing a presentist theory of possible worlds. In chapter four, I set out four alternative approaches a presentist might take in accounting for apparent reference to nonpresent objects, and I consider the benefits and drawbacks of each approach. ;A central aim of the dissertation is to provide a thorough exploration of what is involved in being a presentist. The dissertation addresses such questions as: To what does one commit in embracing presentism? What apparent difficulties does one thereby face, and how might one address them? How does one's endorsement of presentism bear on one's thinking with respect to important subjects of inquiry? ;The discussion between presentists and nonpresentists is part of the ongoing exploration of the relation between time and ontology. Understanding and following this discussion is a helpful means of seeking insight in regard to the nature of time and the general character of all that exists

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