Abstract

This work is part of recent philosophical attempts to reconstruct important areas of scientific activity. Two questions form its focus. First, is there a rational reconstruction of science which allows for cases in which the process of theory change and development constitutes progress? An affirmative answer demands an account of the nature of scientific progress. Second, does this reconstruction make it plausible to maintain that we can be justified in believing that scientific theories are true? These questions are not unrelated; the description of scientific progress will at least partially determine the features on an adequate account of justification. ;I argue that it is rational to think that science has, and will, progress, but some recent accounts of progress are unacceptable. In particular, I find implausible any position according to which the goal of scientific theorizing is true theories, and the belief that more recent theories are closer to the truth than older theories. Progress is not convergence towards the true theory, or towards any other final goal. Instead, cognitive progress consists in the satisfaction of certain inter-theoretic relations. ;I argue that it is not plausible to maintain that we can be justified in believing that scientific theories are true. Instead, it is not irrational to stop short of believing that scientific theories are true. We can be justified in believing that a scientific theory is empirically adequate