Intuition as Philosophical Evidence

Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):297-310 (2012)
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Abstract

Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue (a) that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and (b) that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.

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Federico Pailos
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

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