A general argument against structured propositions

Synthese 196 (4):1501-1528 (2019)
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Abstract

The standard argument against ordered tuples as propositions is that it is arbitrary what truth-conditions they should have. In this paper we generalize that argument. Firstly, we require that propositions have truth-conditions intrinsically. Secondly, we require strongly equivalent truth-conditions to be identical. Thirdly, we provide a formal framework, taken from Graph Theory, to characterize structure and structured objects in general. The argument in a nutshell is this: structured objects are too fine-grained to be identical to truth-conditions. Without identity, there is no privileged mapping from structured objects to truth-conditions, and hence structured objects do not have truth-conditions intrinsically. Therefore, propositions are not structured objects.

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Peter Pagin
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‚ÄźTypes.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.

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References found in this work

Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

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