Naïve realism and the problem of illusion

Analytic Philosophy 63 (3):174-191 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F – appears F in a ‘committal’ way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way – i.e., without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent naïve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing on the distinction between committal and non-committal appearances, I argue that none of the proposals is able to account for illusion as standardly conceived.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Naïve Realism and Illusion.Boyd Millar - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:607-625.
Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):885-902.
Naive Realism and the Science of (Some) Illusions.Ian Phillips - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):353-380.
Austerity and Illusion.Craig French & Ian Phillips - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (15):1-19.
Perceptual presence.Jason Leddington - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.
Color Illusion.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):751-775.
What Is Naive Realism?Damian Leszczyński - 2010 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 5 (2):89-106.
Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Overlap.Jonathan Brink Morgan - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1243-1253.
Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions.Ori Beck - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1175-1190.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-04-25

Downloads
66 (#222,759)

6 months
11 (#128,523)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Søren Overgaard
University of Copenhagen

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.
Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.

View all 28 references / Add more references