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Conditionals and non-constructive reasoning
In Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. Oxford University Press (2010)
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Citations of this work
Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.
Betting on conditionals.Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (3):172-197.
Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.
Conditionals and inferential connections: toward a new semantics.Igor Douven, Shira Elqayam, Henrik Singmann & Janneke van Wijnbergen-Huitink - 2020 - Thinking and Reasoning 26 (3):311-351.
New Psychological Paradigm for Conditionals and General de Finetti Tables.J. Baratgin, D. Over & G. Politzer - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (1):73-84.
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