Abstract
No Abstract
Alvin Plantinga's free will defense is based on the idea of transworld
depravity. Plantinga claims that if an essence suffers from transworld
depravity, then it is not possible for God to actualize a world in which the
instantiation of that essence only does what is right. If every essence
suffers from transworld depravity, then it is not possible for God to
actualize a world in which there is moral good but no moral evil. I begin by
describing possible worlds that imply it is impossible for every essence to
suffer from transworld depravity. I then show how to modify the concept of
transworld depravity to avoid this problem, and to allow for the possibility
that every essence suffers from transworld depravity. This new formulation of
transworld depravity has an interesting consequence, and this leads to an
alternative free will defense that is not based on the concept of transworld
depravity. I introduce the concept of an unobtainable world, and use this to
develop an alternative version of the free will defense that is preferable to
one based on the concept of transworld depravity.