A Fallacy about the Modal Status of Logic

Dialectica 55 (1):9-27 (2001)
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Abstract

In John Etchemendy's book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, several arguments are put forth against the standard model‐theoretic account of logical consequence and logical truth. I argue in this article that crucial parts of Etchemendy's attack depend on a failure to distinguish two senses of logic and two correlative senses of being something a logical question. According to one of these senses, the logic of a language, L, is the set of logical truths of L. In the other sense, logic is a theoretical discipline whose aim is to characterize logical properties and it can be identified with the set of sentences on what, and why, the extension of the set of logical truths of a particular language is. Some particular claims by Etchemendy about the status assigned to the axiom of infinity in the model‐theoretic account are criticized and shown to be erroneous because of that conflation.

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References found in this work

The concept of logical consequence.John Etchemendy - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Atwell Turquette - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (1):113.
Tarski on truth and logical consequence.John Etchemendy - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):51-79.
Varieties of supervenience.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1995 - In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16--59.
Did Tarski commit "Tarski's fallacy"?Gila Sher - 1996 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (2):653-686.

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