Logos and Episteme 10 (4):363-377 (2019)

Tommaso Ostillio
Kozminski University
This paper contributes to the existing philosophical literature on the Knobe Effect in two main ways: first, this paper disconfirms the KE by showing that the latter does not hold in contexts with probable outcomes; second, this paper shows that KE is strongly sensitive to the availability heuristic bias. In particular, this paper presents two main findings from three empirical tests carried out between 2016 and 2018: the first finding concerns the fact that if the issuer of a decision with consequences on third parties is unlikely to be perceived as unfriendly, then KE is reduced or absent; the second finding regards instead the fact that if an action has two possible outcomes, then KE does not obtain for decisions whose side-effects have limited consequences on third parties.
Keywords Knobe Effect  Availability Heuristic  Cognitive Bias  Judgment under uncertainty  Negative Externality
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme201910434
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