What there is, how things are

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 27 (2&3):149–172 (1997)
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Abstract

Ontology is critically assessed as being too narrowly based to contribute substantially to our understanding of the real world. Ontology reflects only what amounts to an extended notion of an object, whereas understanding the real world requires, in addition, the concepts of process, event, and state of affairs. Formal relationships among the four reality concepts are presented and the privileging of any one of them is rejected, the use of the |State of Affairs System leads to a parsimonious formulation of the nature of persons as states of affairs rather than objects. In passing, the notion that states of affairs cannot be located is rejected and the significance of the State of Affairs System for scientific and metaphysical theorizing is noted

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The Ontology of Things, Properties and Powers.Steve Fleetwood - 2009 - Journal of Critical Realism 8 (3):343-366.
Theorizing the mechanisms of conceptual and semiotic space.Colin Wight - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2):283-299.

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