Four ways of (mis-)conceiving embodiment in tool use

Synthese 199 (1-2):3853-3879 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A broader conception of the user’s perceptual, cognitive, and motor capabilities considers tools as body extensions. By identifying specific tool-related motor-grounded mechanisms, the embodied approach assumes that this “extensional phenomenon” takes place not only at a behavioral level but also at a psychological level. At least four ways of conceiving embodiment in tool use have been offered in relation to the concepts of incorporation, perception, knowledge, and observation. Nevertheless, the validity of these conceptions has been rarely, if not never, assessed. In this article, we attempt to fill this gap by discussing each of these conceptions in turn, with the aim of determining whether it is justified to consider tools as detached objects of a special sort in embodied terms. We argue that tool incorporation is made possible by “distalization”, that is, an embodied mechanism specific to tool use. Nevertheless, there is neither empirical nor theoretical support for the hypothesis that specific tool-related embodied mechanisms are involved in perception, knowledge, and observation. In broad terms, there is a tendency in the literature to overinterpret tool use as an embodied phenomenon at a psychological level. Inevitably, this limitation leads us to under-intellectualize the underlying cognitive processes and, as a result, it prevents us from understanding the technical-reasoning skills that allow humans to transform dramatically the physical world.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What is the future for tool-specific generalized motor programs?François Osiurak - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (4):701-708.
Types of abduction in tool behavior.Caruana Fausto & Cuccio Valentina - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):255-273.
Language as a cognitive tool.Marco Mirolli & Domenico Parisi - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):517-528.
Tool use and constructions.Michael A. Arbib - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):218-219.
Look, no hands!Eric M. Patterson & Janet Mann - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):235-236.
Thinking Through Tools: What Can Tool-Use Tell Us About Distributed Cognition?Chris Baber - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):25-40.
Language and tool making are similar cognitive processes.Ralph L. Holloway - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):226-226.
What's that thing called embodiment?Tom Ziemke - 2015 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 6 (2-3):161-174.
Separability and Technical Constitution.Charles Lenay - 2012 - Foundations of Science 17 (4):379-384.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-11-26

Downloads
14 (#846,545)

6 months
3 (#445,838)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Phenomenology of perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.

View all 25 references / Add more references