Abstract

Kant has long been held in some quarters to undermine Hume’s derivation of the concept of cause. At least part of what Kant aims to show in his second analogy, according to adherents of this view, is that our putative awareness of objective succession—and thus of individual events—depends on our already having it. The aim of this paper is fourfold. First, to make clear that there are strong textual grounds for the claim that Kant aims to show this. Second, to reveal a problem with the most prominent defense of the claim that Hume can account for the putative awareness in question without any appeal to the relevant concept. Third, to propose an alternative defense of that claim. And fourth, to defend the position ascribed to Hume on this alternative defense against an attack ascribed to Kant byBeatrice Longuenesse. The conclusion is thus that Kant fails in his attempt to refute Hume’s derivation.