Dialectica 57 (1):7–40 (2003)
AbstractAccording to the received view, descriptivism is a dead end in an attempt to account for singular reference by proper names, indexicals and possibly even incomplete descriptions, for they require referentialism. In contrast to this, I argue for an application of the former to all kinds of singular terms, indexicals in particular, by relying on a view of incomplete descriptions as elliptical in a pragmatic sense. I thus provide a general analysis of singular reference. The proposed approach is in line with the classical theory of propositions, except for admitting “private” ones with subjective mental entities as constituents. On the other hand, there is no commitment to singular Russellian propositions with ordinary objects as constituents and in general to meanings that cannot be “in the mind”
Similar books and articles
The Names of Historical Figures: A Descriptivist Reply.Luis Fernandez Moreno - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):155-168.
Feyerabend and the Description Theory of Reference.Howard Sankey - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:223-232.
Language, Thought, Logic, and Existence.Richard Brown - 2007 - CALIPSO (Conference Addresses of the Long Island Philosophical Society Online) 1 (2):http://myweb.brooklyn.liu.edu/mc.
A Unified Theory of Truth and Reference.Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard - 2000 - Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):49–93.
Aspects of a Theory of Singular Reference: Prolegomena to a Dialectical Logic of Singular Terms.William J. Greenberg - 1982 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads