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Experience is not something we feel but something we do: a principled way of explaining sensory phenomenology, with Change Blindness and other empirical consequences
Abstract
Any theory of experience which postulates that brain mechanisms generate "raw feel" encounters the impassable "explanatory gap" separating physics from phenomenology.Links
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Citations of this work
Visual experience in the predictive brain is univocal, but indeterminate.Kathryn Nave - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):395-419.
An Excess of Meaning: Conceptual Over-Interpretation in Confabulation and Schizophrenia.Joshua A. Bergamin - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):163-176.
Implicit processing of tactile information: Evidence from the tactile change detection paradigm.David Pritchett, Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):534-546.
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