Imagination, Thought Experiments, and Personal Identity

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):69-88 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Should we descry the nature of the self from thought experiments? Shaun Nichols says ‘maybe,’ but only if we use thought experiments that do not recruit the indexical “I” (non-I-recruiting). His reason is that the psychology of “I” perforce mandates that imagination responds to thought experiments that recruit it (I-recruiting) peculiarly. Here, I consider whether he is correct about non-I-recruiting personal identity thought experiments. I argue positively using the same framework, i.e., considering the underlying psychology.

Similar books and articles

Substance and the Concept of Personal Identity.Jens Kipper - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
Back to the self and the future.S. Beck - 1998 - South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):211-225.
Should We Tolerate People Who Split?Simon Beck - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.
Should we tolerate people who split?Simon Beck - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.
Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner.Simon Beck - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):132-140.
Critical Notice of Peter Unger's Identity, Consciousness and Value.Carol Rovane - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):119-133.
Hume's Quandary Concerning Personal Identity.Wayne Waxman - 1992 - Hume Studies 18 (2):233-253.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-05-11

Downloads
159 (#111,195)

6 months
99 (#35,411)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Omoge
University of Alberta

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references