Joint attention to mental content and the social origin of reasoning

Synthese 198 (5):4057-4078 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Growing evidence indicates that our higher rational capacities depend on social interaction—that only through engaging with others do we acquire the ability to evaluate beliefs as true or false, or to reflect on and evaluate the reasons that support our beliefs. Up to now, however, we have had little understanding of how this works. Here we argue that a uniquely human socio-linguistic phenomenon which we call ‘joint attention to mental content’ plays a key role. JAM is the ability to focus together in conversation on the content of our mental states, such as beliefs and reasons. In such conversations it can be made clear that our attitudes to beliefs or reasons may conflict—that what I think is true, you might think is false, or that what I think is a good reason for believing something, you might think is a bad reason. We argue that through JAM, children discover that mental contents can be evaluated under various attitudes, and that this discovery transforms their mind-reading and reasoning abilities.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Joint reminiscing as joint attention to the past.Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 260-286.
Joint attention and understanding others.Michael Schmitz - 2014 - Synthesis Philosophica 29 (2):235-251.
Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
Joint attention and common knowledge.John Campbell - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 287--297.
Joint attention and the problem of other minds.Johannes Roessler - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind.Naomi Eilan - 2005 - In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
Reasoning with conditionals.Guy Politzer - 2007 - Topoi 26 (1):79-95.
Instrumental reasoning.John Broome - 2000 - In Julian Nida-Rümelin & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Rationality, Rules and Structure. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 195-207.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-09-02

Downloads
65 (#245,019)

6 months
18 (#135,981)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Cathal O'Madagain
Universite Mohammed VI Polytechnique

Citations of this work

The cultural evolution of mind-modelling.Richard Moore - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1751-1776.
Consciousness Incorporated.Philip Pettit - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):12-37.
The role of roles in uniquely human cognition and sociality.Michael Tomasello - 2020 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 50 (1):2-19.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

View all 49 references / Add more references