The Zombies Among Us

Noûs 52 (1):216-226 (2016)
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Abstract

Philosophers disagree about whether there could be “zombies”: beings physically identical to normal human people but lacking consciousness. Establishing their possibility would refute physicalism. But it is seldom noted that the popular “constitution view” of human people implies that our bodies actually are zombies. This would contradict several widely held views in the philosophy of mind.

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Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Partial Twinning and the Boundaries of a Person.Eric T. Olson - 2023 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (1):7-24.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.

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