Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):161-166 (1999)
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Abstract

In “Was I Ever a Fetus?” I argued that, since each of us was once an unthinking fetus, psychological continuity cannot be necessary for us to persist through time. Baker claims that the argument is invalid, and that both the premise and the conclusion are false. I attempt to defend argument, premise, and conclusion against her objections.

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00318205

DOI

10.2307/2653463

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Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

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Identity and Becoming.Robert Allen - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):527-548.

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