Relativism and persistence

Philosophical Studies 88 (2):141-162 (1997)
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Abstract

Philosophers often talk as if what it takes for a person to persist through time were up to us, as individuals or as a linguistic community, to decide. In most ordinary situations it might be fully determinate whether someone has survived or perished: barring some unforeseen catastrophe, it is clear enough that you will still exist ten minutes from now, for example. But there is no shortage of actual and imaginary situations where it is not so clear whether one survives. Here reasonable people may disagree. There are "fission" cases where each of one's cerebral hemispheres is transplanted into a different head; Star-Trek-style "teletransportation" stories; actual cases of brain damage so severe that one can never again regain consciousness, even though one's circulation, breathing, digestion, and other "animal" functions continue; and stories where one's brain cells are gradually removed and replaced by cells from someone else, to name only a few favorites.

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Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Self-made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
How to Be a Conventional Person.Kristie Miller - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):457-474.
“Personal identity” minus the persons.Kristie Miller - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):91-109.
Parfit on fission.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):21 - 35.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.
Survival and identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty, The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.

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