A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology

Synthese:1-19 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is whether known disagreement among those who are in symmetrical epistemic positions undermines the rationality of their maintaining their respective views. Douven and Kelp have argued convincingly that this problem is best understood as being about how to respond to peer disagreement repeatedly over time, and that this diachronic issue can be best approached through computer simulation. However, Douven and Kelp’s favored simulation framework cannot naturally handle Christensen’s famous Mental Math example. As a remedy, I introduce an alternative simulation framework, Laputa, inspired by Alvin Goldman’s seminal work on veritistic social epistemology. I show that Christensen’s conciliatory response, reasonably reconstructed and supplemented, gives rise to an increase in epistemic value only if the peers continue to recheck their mental math; else the peers might as well be steadfast. On a meta-level, the study illustrates the power of Goldman’s approach when combined with simulation techniques for handling the computational issues involved.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Group Peer Disagreement.J. Adam Carter - 2014 - Ratio 27 (3):11-28.
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Simulating peer disagreements.Igor Douven - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):148-157.
Some Problems With Steadfast Strategies for Rational Disagreement.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):89-107.
Who is an epistemic peer?Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.
Epistemologia różnicy zdań.Celina Głogowska - 2014 - Filo-Sofija 14 (27):129-140.
Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Filippo Ferrari & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2019 - In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-14

Downloads
21 (#689,095)

6 months
5 (#510,007)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Erik J. Olsson
Lund University

Citations of this work

Why Bayesian Agents Polarize.Erik J. Olsson - forthcoming - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.

View all 16 references / Add more references