Why Bioethics Should Be Concerned With Medically Unexplained Symptoms

American Journal of Bioethics 18 (5):6-15 (2018)
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Abstract

Biomedical diagnostic science is a great deal less successful than we've been willing to acknowledge in bioethics, and this fact has far-reaching ethical implications. In this article I consider the surprising prevalence of medically unexplained symptoms, and the term's ambiguous meaning. Then I frame central questions that remain answered in this context with respect to informed consent, autonomy, and truth-telling. Finally, I show that while considerable attention in this area is given to making sure not to provide biological care to patients without a need, comparatively little is given to the competing, ethically central task of making sure never to obstruct access to biological care for those with diagnostically confusing biological conditions. I suggest this problem arises from confusion about the philosophical value of vagueness when it comes to the line between biological and psychosocial needs.

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Author's Profile

Diane O'Leary
University of Sydney (PhD)

References found in this work

Hysteria and the Varieties of Deception.Richard A. Kanaan - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (1):55-64.

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