Abstract

To speak of a right by its proper name, as we do with the constitutional right to privacy, is to presume we intuitively know something about the character of the right we have identified. The first amendment rights of free speech, and freedom of religion, for example, have been litigated ad nauseam, the result of which is an understanding at least of the general parameters which outline the right. ;The asserted right to privacy is different. It is neither a stated constitutional right, as is freedom of religion, nor is its meaning unambiguous. With more than two centuries to contemplate the nature of the right to privacy in America, with nearly 1,300 court cases litigating the definition of the right to privacy, between 1965 and 1980, and with nearly three decades of focused scholarship on this issue, still there are widely differing views on the origin, definition and legitimacy of the constitutional right to privacy in the American republic. While we talk of the right to privacy with some confidence that we understand the concept, a long and convoluted line of cases suggests we do not. ;This dissertation examines the philosophical nature of the presumed constitutional right to privacy, in light of American republicanism, defined by the Declaration of Independence, and the United States Constitution. Full analysis will be given to the philosophical origins of private rights, the limits of the right to privacy, and the limiting principles against which the right to privacy is balanced. Particular consideration will be given to axial principles of the political philosophies which shaped the American founding. Such principles include the concepts of equality, property, happiness, liberty and virtue, and the impact of each of these on a conception of private rights. ;The contemporary claim of a right to privacy, and the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in defense of such a right, will be examined. The thesis of the dissertation is that the founding philosophy and principles of natural rights are contrary to the claim of a right to privacy, as currently construed by the Court and by the academy