Philosopher in the market square: Probing the statement ‘I was misled’

Human Affairs 28 (2):119-129 (2018)
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Abstract

Traditionally, such a statement as ‘I was misled’ is intended to be taken seriously by the addressee and considered an expression of the true state of affairs. Unfortunately, the statement has many logical implications that often go unnoticed by both the one who utters it and the addressee. The paper critically explores the instrumentality of logical and epistemological analyses in its attempt to lay bare the implications of the statement being true and of entertaining the underlying belief in the first place that ‘I was misled’. By so doing, the paper attempts to show that even if the function of philosophy is merely to analyse language, it would still have contributed indispensably and significantly to human society by clarifying ambiguous concepts. It also attempts to demonstrate the relevance of critical thinking in human society.

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References found in this work

Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Causation.D. Lewis - 1973 - In Philosophical Papers Ii. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
Causes and Conditions.J. L. Mackie - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):245 - 264.
Causal relations.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.

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