The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):381 – 404 (1993)
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Abstract

While avoiding relativism, Rorty claims that: (1) truth is just for a time and a place; (2) ?truth? and ?rationality? are indexed to a community's standards of warranted assertibility; and (3) there is nothing more to be said about truth and rationality than is contained, in a community's procedures for evaluating claims. He makes these assertions because he believes that the cautionary uses of ?true? and ?rational? crucially depend upon the endorsing uses of these terms. I argue that Rorty is wrong in this belief and that the principle of charity assures us that in their cautionary uses ?true? and ?rational? are independent of any idiosyncracies associated with any community's current standards of justification

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Citations of this work

Truth and Thickness. [REVIEW]John Tietz - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (2):375-380.

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References found in this work

Objectivity, relativism, and truth.Richard Rorty - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truth in philosophy.Barry Allen - 1993 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Coherence, Justification, and Truth.Michael Williams - 1980 - Review of Metaphysics 34 (2):243 - 272.
Representation, social practise, and truth.Richard Rorty - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (2):215 - 228.

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