- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
On a flawed argument against the KK principle
Analysis 73 (1):80-86 (2013)
Abstract
Externalists in epistemology often reject the KK principle – which says that if a person knows that p, then they know that they know that p. This paper argues that one standard argument against the KK principle that many externalists make is fallacious, as it involves illicit substitution into an intensional context. The fallacy is exposed and discussedAuthor's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- analysis.oxfordjournals.org (no proxy)
- analysis.oxfordjournals.org [2] (no proxy)
- analysis.oxfordjournals.org [3] (no proxy)
- analysis.oxfordjournals.org [4] (no proxy)
- analysis.oxfordjournals.org [5] (no proxy)
- jstor.org (no proxy)
- academic.oup.com (no proxy)
- research-information.bristol.ac.uk
(no proxy) - research-information.bristol.ac.uk [2] (no proxy)
- research-information.bristol.ac.uk [3] (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Talking lions and lion talk: Davidson on conceptual schemes.Jack S. Crumley - 1989 - Synthese 80 (3):347-371.
Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (4):433-445.
The Certainty of Skepticism.Paul Oppenheimer & Ralf Meerbote - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 11 (1):125-128.
A dilemma for Searle's argument for the connection principle.Kirk Ludwig - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):194-5.
Williamson’s Argument Against the KK-Principle 157.Murali Ramachandran - 2005 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
There is no 'truthmaker' argument against nominalism.Josh Parsons - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.
Is there a modal fallacy in van Inwagen's 'First Formal Argument'?J. Westphal - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):36-41.
The Principle of Procreative Beneficence: Old Arguments and A New Challenge.Andrew Hotke - 2012 - Bioethics 28 (5):255-262.
Contextual unanimity and the units of selection problem.Stuart Glennan - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):118-137.
Two Objections to Yaffe on the Criminalization of Attempts.Alexander Sarch - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (3):569-587.
A response to Almeida and Judisch.Alexander Pruss & Richard M. Gale - 2003 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):65-72.
Analytics
Added to PP
2012-11-14
Downloads
470 (#38,930)
6 months
28 (#106,370)
2012-11-14
Downloads
470 (#38,930)
6 months
28 (#106,370)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle.Richard Pettigrew & Alexander Bird - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1713-1732.
Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle.Alexander Bird & Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1-20.
The KK Principle and the Strong Notion of Knowledge: Hintikka’s Arguments for KK Revisited.Chen Bo - forthcoming - History and Philosophy of Logic:1-17.
References found in this work
Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-7c76586df8-pp8v9 uwo