Laudan and Leplin on empirical equivalence

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):251-256 (1997)
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Abstract

In this paper, I explore Larry Laudan's and Jarrett Leplin's recent claim that empirically equivalent theories may be differentially confirmed. I show that their attempt to prise apart empirical equivalence and epistemic parity commits them to two principles of confirmation that Hempel demonstrated to be incompatible.

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Samir Okasha
University of Bristol

References found in this work

Logical Foundations of Probability.Ernest H. Hutten - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):205-207.
Empirical equivalence and underdetermination.Larry Laudan & Jarrett Leplin - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (9):449-472.

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