AbstractThe concept of a judgment as a logical action which introduces new information into a deductive system is examined. This leads to a way of mathematically representing implication which is distinct from the familiar material implication, according to which "If A then B" is considered to be equivalent to "B or not-A". This leads, in turn, to a resolution of the paradox of the raven.
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