On the cardinality of the cardinal virtues

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):305 – 322 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper is a detailed study of what are traditionally called the cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. I defend what I call the Cardinality Thesis, that the traditional four and no others are cardinal. I define cardinality in terms of three sub-theses, the first being that the cardinal virtues are jointly necessary for the possession of every other virtue, the second that each of the other virtues is a species of one of the four cardinals, and the third that many of the other virtues are also auxiliaries of one or more cardinals. I provide abstract arguments for each sub-thesis, followed by illustration from concrete cases. I then use these results to shed light on the two fundamental problems of the acquisition of the virtues and their unity, proving some further theses in the latter case.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
65 (#224,466)

6 months
5 (#244,526)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David S. Oderberg
University of Reading

Citations of this work

Virtues are excellences.Paul Bloomfield - 2021 - Ratio 35 (1):49-60.
The Skills of Justice.Paul Bloomfield - 2021 - In Ellen Fridland & Pavase Carlotta (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Skills and Expertise. London: Rutledge. pp. 460-475.
Piety as a Virtue.Jeremy Schwartz & David Hayes - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (1):109-126.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references