Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):561 - 568 (1976)
| Abstract |
Robert richman tries to defend a justified-True-Belief analysis of knowledge by attacking the assumption that a justified belief can be false. But, Although 'p is justified but false' is incoherent if asserted about the way things actually are, It is not incoherent if asserted about a supposed situation. And critics of a justified-True-Belief analysis need only do the latter
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| DOI | 10.1080/00455091.1976.10716168 |
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References found in this work BETA
An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples.Richard Feldman - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):68 – 69.
Knowledge Without Paradox.Robert G. Meyers & Kenneth Stern - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (6):147-160.
Why I Know so Much More Than You Do.William W. Rozeboom - 1967 - American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):281 - 290.
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Citations of this work BETA
Prospects for a Causal Theory of Knowledge.Philip P. Hanson - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):457 - 473.
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