Abstract
In a recent and most compelling paper, Professor Edward Madden has argued, in effect, that it is high time for the removal of the Hume-colored glasses on causality through which too many philosophers have been seeing “nomic” necessity for too long. Rather, it is Madden’s contention that the Humean view on causality contains far more “ontological looseness” than is justified and needs to be supplanted by a view of causality as “natural necessity that carries with it an internal warrant of inductive inference”. However, while there can be little doubt that the view proposed by Madden is ontologically “tighter” than the Humean view, he makes it clear at the outset that his correction of Hume is not to be identified “with the familiar entailment view of causality”. Now this, I believe, raises a very interesting point, namely, while Madden says that his view is not to be identified with the entailment position, he never gets down to telling us precisely how it differs from the latter. In this regard, then, it shall be my contention that there is no substantive difference whatsoever between Madden’s view and the entailment view. Hence, while I agree with virtually everything Madden has said on causality and agree with it largely because I do take it to be a much needed and cogent correction of the Humean position, I hope to show that, ironically enough, the view for which Madden argues necessarily commits him to the very entailment view he is so obviously anxious to avoid. That is, I am convinced that the view proposed and defended by Madden is—from start to finish—identical with the view that the causal relation is a relation of entailment.