A FALÁCIA NATURALISTA E A DERIVAÇÃO DE SEARLE

Perspectiva Filosófica 2 (49):133-147 (2022)
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Abstract

In this article we intend to characterize the issue of the so-called naturalistic fallacy and to evaluate how John Searle approaches it. To do this, we will briefly approach the arguments of David Hume and G. E. Moore and then analyze how Searle's objections to the alleged fallacy relate to such approaches and if have been successful.

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Daniel Pires Nunes
Universidade de Caxias Do Sul

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References found in this work

How to Derive Ought from Is.John Searle - 1964 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics.David O. Brink - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):154.
Some Questions concerning Validity.J. O. Urmson - 1953 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 7 (3):217.

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