In New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. pp. 169--184 (2003)

Authors
Susana Nuccetelli
St. Cloud State University
Abstract
Twin-earth thought experiments, standardly construed, support the externalist doctrine that the content of propositional attitudes involving natural-kind terms supervenes upon properties external to those who entertain them. But this doctrine in conjunction with a common view of self-knowledge might have the intolerable consequence that substantial propositions concerning the environment could be knowable a priori. Since both doctrines, externalism and privileged self-knowledge, appear independently plausible, there is then a paradox facing the attempt to hold them concurrently. I shall argue, however, that externalist claims about the dependence of content on environmental factors presuppose certain theses about the semantics of natural-kind terms that, if sound, would make those claims eligible for empirical justification instead. In fact, that is the only interpretation of their epistemic status that could square with the standard conclusion from twin-earth cases. Furthermore, it can be shown to solve the paradox of externalism and self-knowledge in a more doxastically conservative way--accommodating precisely each of the well-accepted intuitions about knowledge, closure and the individuation of content given up by available competitors.
Keywords semantic externalism and self-knowledge
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading.Joel Smith - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):274-293.
Deception and Evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
What's Wrong with McKinsey-Style Reasoning?James Pryor - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Knowing-That, Knowing-How, and Knowing Philosophically.Stephen Hetherington - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):307-324.
Knowing-How and Knowing-That.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
Knowing How Without Knowing That.Yuri Cath - 2011 - In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 113.
Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do.Refeng Tang - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Beyond Subjectivism.Blythe McVicker Clinchy - 2007 - Tradition and Discovery 34 (1):15-31.
Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press. pp. 163--178.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
379 ( #26,667 of 2,506,852 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #68,237 of 2,506,852 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes