Authors
John D. Norton
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
A simple indeterministic system is displayed and it is urged that we cannot responsibly infer inductively over it if we presume that the probability calculus is the appropriate logic of induction. The example illustrates the general thesis of a material theory of induction, that the logic appropriate to a particular domain is determined by the facts that prevail there.
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1959 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

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Citations of this work BETA

Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John D. Norton - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm R. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V.. pp. 391-440.

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Similar books and articles

Induction and Objectivity.F. John Clendinnen - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (3):215-229.
The Rationality of Induction.David Charles Stove - 1986 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
A Material Theory of Induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
A Little Survey of Induction.John D. Norton - 2005 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories and Applications. pp. 9-34.
There Are No Universal Rules for Induction.John D. Norton - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.

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