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A simple indeterministic system is displayed and it is urged that we cannot responsibly infer inductively over it if we presume that the probability calculus is the appropriate logic of induction. The example illustrates the general thesis of a material theory of induction, that the logic appropriate to a particular domain is determined by the facts that prevail there.
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References found in this work BETA
Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
View all 15 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John D. Norton - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm R. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V.. pp. 391-440.
History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein’s Quanta, Mercury’s Perihelion.John D. Norton - 2007 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):3-27.
History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein’s Quanta, Mercury’s Perihelion.John Norton - manuscript
Similar books and articles
A Little Survey of Induction.John D. Norton - 2005 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories and Applications. pp. 9-34.
Some Worries for Norton’s Material Theory of Induction.Steffen Ducheyne - 2008 - Philosophia Naturalis 45 (1):37-46.
There Are No Universal Rules for Induction.John D. Norton - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.
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75 ( #155,761 of 2,520,842 )
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2 ( #270,509 of 2,520,842 )
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