Précis of action in perception: Philosophy and phenomenological research [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):660–665 (2008)
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Abstract

The main idea of this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person taptapping his or her way around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to the perceiver through physical movement and interaction. In this book I argue that all perception is touch-like in this way: perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession of bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by what we do (or what we know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do. In ways I try to make precise, we enact our perceptual experience; we act it out

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Alva Noë
University of California, Berkeley

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What’s so Special About Interaction in Social Cognition?Julius Schönherr - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):181-198.

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