SATS 20 (1):1-18 (2019)

Jörg Noller
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
In my paper, I shall take seriously Kant’s puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect, which is, according to him, “a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different” from all common feelings. I will focus on the systematic position of the moral feeling of respect within the framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By considering its volitional structure, I argue for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and affectivist interpretations are true. As such, respect can be understood in terms of a process of moral self-consciousness and self-formation, which means that the will must be freed from initial empirical motives, and finally be determined only by rational principles.
Keywords Kant  moral feeling  moral motivation  respect
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DOI 10.1515/sats-2019-0012
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Henry E. Allison - 1988 - Yale University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Kant on Wonder as the Motive to Learn.Melissa Zinkin - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (6):921-934.
Vernünfteln: Kant über die Rationalität des Bösen.Jörg Noller - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (1):28-50.

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