Epistemic norms, all things considered

Synthese 198 (7):6717-6737 (2019)
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An action-oriented epistemology takes the idea that our capacity for belief subserves our capacity for action as the starting point for epistemological theorizing. This paper argues that an action-oriented epistemology is especially well-positioned to explain why it is that, at least for believers like us, whether or not conforming with the epistemic norms that govern belief-regulation would lead us to believe that p always bears on whether we have normative reasons to believe that p. If the arguments of this paper are successful, then an action-oriented approach has a kind of explanatory power that has proved elusive, and so merits serious and sustained philosophical attention that it has yet to receive.



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Kate Nolfi
University of Vermont

Citations of this work

Why Mary Left Her Room.Michaela M. McSweeney - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Against the newer evidentialists.David Thorstad - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3511-3532.
Epistemically flawless false beliefs.Kate Nolfi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309.
Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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