Die Stimmung des Willens: Schillers ästhetischer Kompatibilismus

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 69 (4):529-552 (2021)
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Abstract

This paper reconstructs Friedrich Schiller’s aesthetics from a compatibilist point of view. I shall argue that it is Schiller’s conception of individual self-determination that motivates his aesthetic critique of Kant’s moral philosophy. Schiller conceives of aesthetic self-determination in terms of a compatibilism between reason and nature. As such, Schiller’s aesthetics can be interpreted as an ontological category. His concepts of love, play and the aesthetic state must therefore be understood in terms of volitional structures that describe human freedom in nature, history and society.

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Jörg Noller
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

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